Evil, Freedom and Heaven by Cushing, Simon
Evil, Freedom and Heaven 
 
Simon Cushing 
 
1. Introduction 
 
My entry point into the topic of this chapter came while teaching the problem of evil 
in Philosophy of Religion, where I raise what I have called, for lack of a better name, the 
“Heaven Dilemma.” The problem of evil is, of course, why there should be any evil (and 
more broadly, suffering) in this world if it was created and overseen by a God who both has 
the power to prevent the evil befalling his children, and an all-loving nature that should 
prompt him to use that power. Those who believe the problem can be solved without 
abandoning the view of God that seems to give rise to it overwhelmingly appeal to free will.1 
The “free will defense”2 relies on two core principles: that free will unavoidably bring with it 
evil, but that free will is also of such immense value (whether in itself or because it is 
necessary for some other great good) that it is better we have it than that there be no evil. But 
any version of the free will defense confronts the Heaven Dilemma as follows. If we assume 
both that existence in heaven is superior to our earthly existence in this vale of tears and 
furthermore that those in heaven commit no evil then the dilemma is this: either those in 
heaven are free without committing evil (which would undermine one of the core principles 
of the free will defense) or they are not free (which would undermine the other). Whichever it 
is, you can’t have both principles of the free will defense together, so the defense fails. 
That’s not the end of the story, however. James Sennett3 has suggested a way out of 
the dilemma by arguing, effectively, that freedom functions differently on Earth and in 
heaven such that the heavenly variety does not involve the risk of evil, yet is still of 
 comparable value to the earthly kind that does. An obvious pitfall of such an approach is that 
if it is possible anywhere to be free in a valuable way without the risk of evil, then the 
problem of evil recurs in a new form: why don’t we have that good kind of freedom on Earth? 
Or, if it can be convincingly argued that you cannot have that kind of freedom on Earth, then 
the value of the risk-free heavenly freedom raises the Problem of the Apparent Pointlessness 
of Earth: why not have an entirely heavenly existence? Especially since we’re going to spend 
an infinity there anyway (if we’re lucky) so that the section of our existence spent on Earth is 
effectively zero. I examine Sennett’s argument (and the related conception of freedom that it 
presupposes, argued for by Robert Kane) and possible responses available to him to rebut 
both these criticisms. I conclude, however, that the responses are unsatisfactory for a variety 
of reasons (infants who die before developing the capabilities of choice present a particular 
challenge) and that therefore theistic beliefs about heaven cannot be reconciled with the free 
will defense. 
 
2. Freedom and the Problem of Evil 
 
The following claims are central to theism, the view of God at the core of Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam: 
 
Claim 1: OMNIPOTENCE: God is all-powerful. 
Claim 2: OMNIBENEVOLENCE: God is all-loving. 
Claim 3: CREATION: God created the universe.4 
 
 As I said in the introduction, these properties have been taken to be at odds with the quantity 
of suffering evident in the world. In response, the majority of theists endorse some version of 
the free will defense, and as such assert the following: 
 
Claim 4: EARTHLY FREEDOM: Some of God’s creatures, humans in particular, 
have free will. 
 
This claim, which is rather vague (as there are many different ways to understand “free 
will”), is not enough for the theist by itself, because it needs to be shown both that it is 
entirely right and proper that God create such free beings, but that further, God could not do 
so without allowing them to produce the evils of the famous problem. Each of these 
assertions requires its own principle, and all variants of a free will defense assert some 
version of the following: 
 
Claim 5: IEF (the Inevitability of Evil accompanying Freedom): Freedom is such 
that it is not in God’s power to create genuinely free beings like those 
alluded to in EARTHLY FREEDOM without them performing some evil 
acts.5 
Claim 6: TVF (the Transcendent Value of Freedom): The exercise of freedom in 
the right way is necessary to the creation of some phenomenon6 whose 
value is such that it can outweigh evil that may result from the exercise of 
freedom in the wrong way. 
 
Essentially, all versions of a free will defense7 share the idea that given certain facts about 
our universe, even an omnipotent God was not able to give humans the kind of freedom that 
 is of transcendent value without evil resulting, but that God was still right to grant that 
freedom because any world that he could have created without freedom or evil would not be 
as good.  
 
3. The Heaven Dilemma for the Free Will Defense 
 
Heaven for theists is very like communism for Marxists: it’s crucially important that it 
be coming, but very little is actually said about it. However, traditional theism is committed 
to the following three claims about the nature of heaven. First, some, if not all, humans can, 
under certain circumstances, enter heaven (whereupon they can be known as “the 
redeemed”). That this should be so is vital to heaven’s roles in theism. Besides being a 
reassurance that one’s existence does not end at the grave, heaven provides both an incentive 
to live one’s earthly life right, and a salve against the injustices of this mortal coil. For heaven 
to function thus, heaven has to be both free of evil and better than Earth. Thus: 
 
Claim 7: ACCESSIBILITY: Heaven contains8 some “redeemed” ex-Earthlings. 
Claim 8: IMPECCABILITY: The redeemed cannot do evil.9 
Claim 9: SUBLIMITY: (Existence in) heaven is the best possible state of existence 
for its inhabitants.10 
 
So much is, I think, uncontroversial. The trouble is, it appears that these claims taken as a 
group, alongside the evident truth that there is evil here on Earth, appear to have 
contradictory implications. Thus the Heaven Dilemma: one and only one of the following 
logically contradictory statements can be true: 
 
 Claim 10:  HEAVENLY FREEDOM: At least some, and possibly all of the 
redeemed in heaven are capable of free actions (have free will). 
Claim 10:*  HEAVENLY UNFREEDOM: None of the redeemed in heaven have free 
will. 
 
As these two are contradictories, any set of claims that implies both of them must be 
inconsistent. But this is the case with the theistic claims we have already given. For it should 
be clear that IEF + IMPECCABILITY (claims 5 and 8) together imply HEAVENLY 
UNFREEDOM (10*), because if freedom unavoidably brings evil (5) but the redeemed do 
not do evil (8) then they cannot be free (10*). On the other hand, EARTHLY FREEDOM + 
TVF + SUBLIMITY (claims 4, 6 and 9) together imply HEAVENLY FREEDOM (10), 
because if we are free on Earth (4) and any state of existence with free beings in it is better 
than one without (6), yet heaven is better than Earth (9), then the fate of the once-Earthlings 
in heaven must include that valuable freedom they used to have (10).  
If we remain committed to the claims about heaven, then the implication is that the 
two core claims of any free will defense cannot both be true at once. That is, either people in 
heaven are free, in which case it is false that freedom necessitates evil (IEF is false) or people 
in heaven are not free, in which case it is false that freedom is required for world to be 
optimal (TVF is false). What can the theist say in response?  
 
4. Unacceptable Response: Evil in Heaven 
 
The simplest response is to discard one of the claims, in the hope that the remaining 
claims are mutually consistent. Of course, I contend that a true theist is committed to all of 
 them, but of all of them perhaps IMPECCABILITY is least obviously essential. If we discard 
it, however, what are we saying? There are two clear alternatives.  
The more extreme alternative is to assert that, not only is evil possible in heaven, it 
will happen or has already occurred. Some support for this position might be found in the 
story of Lucifer rebelling against God. However, apart from the fact that this story is not 
necessarily canonical,11 Lucifer’s presence in heaven was not achieved in the same way as 
one of the redeemed and we are focusing on the state of being of (ex-) humans in heaven. 
Furthermore, the existence of evil-doing by the redeemed in heaven would open a big enough 
theological can of worms to merit ruling out this response for the purposes of this paper.12  
The milder alternative, then, is to allow that evil in heaven is in fact possible, even if 
it is not, and never will be, actual. That is, instead of IMPECCABILITY we have: 
 
Claim 8: ABSENCE: There will not be evil in heaven (even if it is always 
possible). 
 
There are reasons both philosophical and theological why this initially plausible response will 
not do. I’ll let Sennett handle the theology: 
 
[T]raditional theism regards heaven as a place in which evil is completely 
eradicated—it is not even possible that any should arise. The difference between 
heaven and Earth is not simply that Earth contains evil while heaven does not… If 
heaven is nothing more than a place where the possibility of freedom and no evil is 
realized, then the absence of evil in heaven is purely contingent on the choices of 
human beings, and not a matter of God’s sovereignty or the nature of heaven at all. 
But the traditional view of heaven in that it owes its purity to the unmediated presence 
 of God. Heaven is essentially pristine, grounded in divine immanence, not 
contingently so due to the fortunate choices of humans. (69) 
 
Furthermore, if heaven is only evil-free contingent on the choices of its human 
occupants, then it is constantly in danger of losing its evil-free status, since it is 
always in the power of those occupants to introduce evil into heaven. But certainly the 
idea that heaven might yet become a place of sin and rebellion is contrary to 
traditional theism. In order for heaven to be essentially pristine and free from future 
corruption, it must be necessarily evil-free—it cannot be possible for there to be evil. 
(70) 
 
The philosophical problem with replacing IMPECCABILITY with ABSENCE is that it 
appears directly to undercut IEF, because it allows that a whole realm of being can contain 
agents acting freely (for an infinite time, no less) without evil resulting. This raises a new 
version of the problem of evil: if it is possible for freedom to exist without evil in heaven, 
why are the two inextricably linked on Earth? Allowing freedom to exist without evil at all 
seems to lay the responsibility for the existence of evil at God’s feet: he could have made us 
genuinely free without the accompanying cost of evil.  
Another way to think of this problem is as an instance of a more general problem for 
views that incorporate the notion of heaven: the problem of the Apparent Pointlessness of 
Earth (henceforth APE). If we can enjoy in heaven every possible good that Earth brings, 
along with incalculably many more, and furthermore avoid the pitfalls of sin (which are 
usually taken to include the possibility of an eternity in hell, should the sin be serious 
enough), then why should any time spent on Earth be of value? Aren’t the infants who die 
before they have a chance to sin obviously better off in all respects than those who don’t, 
 especially those who go on to commit heinous sins on Earth and condemn themselves to 
hell?13 To make APE vivid, one should try to take the point of view of God facing the choice 
of bringing into being just heaven, or heaven plus an extra, very inferior, evil-ridden plane of 
existence. One might by analogy imagine choosing between building the Taj Mahal, or a 
slightly smaller Taj Mahal with a tin shed tacked on the side. This will come up again below, 
but for now I conclude that discarding IMPECCABILITY is an unacceptable response to the 
dilemma.  
Sennett believes that there is a way out of the dilemma that draws on a sophisticated 
conception of the nature of free will that has been developed by Robert Kane, a contemporary 
specialist on the topic. So to make sense of Sennett’s attempted solution we need to take a 
detour into some background about the debate over the nature of free will. 
 
5. Compatibilism vs. Libertarianism and Kane’s Compromise 
 
There are two major camps among philosophers who believe humans have free will. 
The dominant position is compatibilism, the view that even if one’s actions are fully 
determined by the state of the universe and the laws of nature, one’s actions can still be 
free.14 According to classic compatibilism of the kind defended by philosophers like Thomas 
Hobbes, David Hume and John Stuart Mill, an action is performed freely simply if the person 
performing it wanted to do so and was not coerced against her will.  
Compatibilism is a non-starter for free will defenders, however.15 As Kane notes, it is 
ill-equipped to provide the firewall between God and responsibility for evil that they desire: 
 
Compatibilists believe that freedom (in all the sense worth wanting) could exist in a 
determined world. But if we did live in a determined world and it was also true that 
 God had created that world, then everything that happened in that world would have 
been predetermined, and hence predestined, by God’s act of creation. The ultimate 
responsibility for all that occurs would go back to God.16  
 
Free will defenders thus opt for the other major position on free will: metaphysical 
libertarianism, which rejects both compatibilism and determinism. As we are interested in the 
variant of libertarianism that Sennett defends, let us begin, as he does, by citing a favorite 
argument of contemporary libertarians against any compatibilist position, what Peter van 
Inwagen calls the “consequence argument:” 
 
If determinism is true, then our actions are the consequences of laws of nature and 
events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, 
neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these 
things are not up to us.17 
 
This argument sets a necessary condition for an action to be “up to” the person performing it: 
there must be a break in its causal history such that what follows the break is not determined 
by what came before it. Libertarians believe they can give an account of freedom that meets 
this condition. Exactly where the break needs to occur, however, is a matter that divides 
libertarians. 
Let us crudely divide the universe into three elements, relative to any particular 
individual. The first is everything (both in space and in time) that is “external” to that 
individual, such as environmental factors and everything beyond the control of that 
individual. The second is all that might be called “internal” to the individual, which 
comprises what you might call her “self” or her “character:”18 things like beliefs, desires, 
 predilections, temperament, virtues, vices, et al. The third is the events that (for lack of a 
better term) result from the individual, which can rightfully be attributed to her. Most 
relevantly for our purposes, these would include all her actions. Libertarians could demand a 
break between the first and the second element (call that 1B2 Libertarianism, where the “B” 
represents the indeterministic break) or the second and the third (2B3 Libertarianism).  
What you might call “classic” libertarianism is of the 2B3 variety. On this view, for 
every free action, given a complete description of the makeup of an individual’s character 
and the circumstances, the resulting action is still undetermined. A popular way of conveying 
this idea is to imagine two distinct possible worlds19 that are identical to the last detail right 
up to and including the character of the person acting, but diverging at the moment of choice, 
so that in one world the agent does one thing and in the other she does another, but in each of 
which the action was performed freely. 
Putting the break between character and action in this way has long been 
controversial. Mill pointed out that we would be insulted if our friends were not able to 
predict what we would do in most situations.20 And Hume argued that, without a 
deterministic link between character and action, an agent’s actions cannot be a source of 
blame or credit to her.21 As we have seen, compatibilists insist that what we look for in 
freedom is freedom from coercion. More broadly, they insist that to be free is to be in control 
of one’s actions. But the control we look for requires that our character determine our 
actions. A break of the kind this classic libertarianism requires would impede freedom, not 
facilitate it: the picture it presents looks more like random things happening to people rather 
than people in control of their actions. Call this compatibilist charge against libertarianism the 
“Indeterminism Undermines Control” (IUC) complaint. 
Kane allows that the compatibilist may be on to something, in two respects. First, 
indeterminism between character and action is a barrier to freedom and not the source of it: 
  
One thing does seem to be true about control which critics of indeterminist freedom 
have always maintained: indeterminism, wherever it occurs, does seem to diminish 
rather than enhance agents’ voluntary control… Moreover, this limitation is 
connected to another, which I think we must also grant—that indeterminism, 
wherever it occurs, functions as a hindrance or obstacle to our purposes that must be 
overcome by effort.22 
 
Second, it seems right to say that we can have natures that both determine, and rule out 
alternatives to, certain actions that are nonetheless free. Both Kane and Sennett endorse the 
example introduced by (compatibilist) Daniel Dennett of Martin Luther. Luther supposedly 
said of his famous action, “here I stand; I can do no other.”23 Dennett contends that we should 
take this seriously as an example where Luther’s character was such that no other action was 
possible.24 In other words, his character determined his action. Dennett further argues that 
Luther’s act was nonetheless free. Kane agrees on both counts, which means that he cannot 
be a classic libertarian of the 2B3 variety. However, Kane keeps his libertarian bonafides by 
instead endorsing a kind of 1B2 view: actions that are determined by one’s character can 
nonetheless be free, but only so long as that character has not been entirely determined. 
So to recap: compatibilism is a view of freedom that makes free actions entirely 
predictable to an omnipotent being and which would allow that being to create free beings 
who will never commit evil. It thereby undermines IEF. However, it faces the consequence 
argument, which demands that there be a point in the history leading up to an action such that 
what follows the break is not entirely predictable even on the basis of total knowledge of the 
universe up to that break. Libertarianism claims to meet the challenge of the consequence 
argument, and also open the door to IEF.25 However, libertarianism faces IUC, the challenge 
 that the break it demands simply undermines the control that is a core feature of our 
conception of what it is to act freely. IUC, if telling, would undermine both claims of a free 
will defense. TVF would fall, because, if no praise or blame can accrue to the character of the 
agent, what is the value of the act? And with no blame, where is the evil that IEF asserts? 26  
Kane argues that for a freedom that is truly valuable we must somehow avoid both the 
consequence argument and IUC, and believes that his version of 1B3 libertarianism can do 
that. There is one more element to add, however, because it should be clear that simply 
having an indeterministic break between external forces and one’s internal character is, by 
itself, not the magic bullet that renders one free. To see that, consider what I’ll call the 
“Marvel Origin Case.” Suppose that we are considering two individuals: one, Rick, has a 
character that (a) is entirely determined by external forces, and (b) á la the Martin Luther 
example, entirely determines his actions. Another, Bruce, also has a character that determines 
his actions, but unlike Rick, a key aspect of Bruce’s character was formed as a result of some 
bizarre neurochemical accident involving the indeterministic decay of some radioactive 
substance he was exposed to in utero, thereby providing the indeterministic break that 
ensures that his character trait is not a “consequences of laws of nature and events in the 
remote past.” In such a case, the requirement of the consequence argument is met, yet this 
surely would not be sufficient to make Bruce’s actions valuable in the IVF sense if Rick’s are 
not. We need more. Kane realizes this, and suggests that the extra element is that the 
character of a person whose determined actions can nonetheless be free is self-formed. He 
argues that there are self-forming actions27 (SFAs) that are distinct from regular actions 
because their effect is to shape one’s own character, and it is only if one’s character has been 
(at least partially) shaped by undetermined (i.e., libertarian rather than compatibilist) SFAs 
that the trick is turned and you get the ideal form of freedom that avoids both the 
consequence argument and IUC: 
  
All actions done of our own free wills do not have to be undetermined SFAs of this 
kind… But if no actions in our lifetimes were of this undetermined self-forming or 
will-setting kind, then our wills would not be our own free wills and we would not be 
ultimately responsible for anything we did.28 
 
There is more to be said, and we’ll get to it, but that outline is enough to prepare us for 
Sennett’s use of a Kanean conception to attempt a solution to the Heaven Dilemma.  
 
6. Sennett’s Solution: Libertarianism on Earth, Compatibilism in Heaven 
 
Sennett broadly endorses Kane’s view, as I have said. As he puts it, “A character that 
is libertarian freely chosen is the only kind of character that can determine compatibilist free 
actions.” 29 He also adds some helpful terminology: actions like Martin Luther’s are 
“proximately determined” and can be free, so long as they are “remotely undetermined.” 
With these terms in hand, the essence of Sennett’s response to the Heaven Dilemma is given 
by the following passage. 
 
Consider the conception of general freedom. A world segment includes general 
freedom just in case that segment includes libertarian freedom or (proximate) 
compatibilist freedom. It can be argued, consistent with the free will defense, that it is 
general freedom, not libertarian freedom per se, that manifests the freedom good. 
Either libertarian freedom or (proximate) compatibilist freedom is sufficient for 
general freedom. Thus, any world segment excluding libertarian freedom but 
 including (proximate) compatibilist freedom is a world segment manifesting the 
freedom good.30 
 
Let us spell this out in steps: 
 
i. IEF applies to any actions that are free in a libertarian sense, but not to any 
actions that are proximately determined. 
ii. Our actions on Earth must include actions that shape our characters, and such 
actions are only truly free (that is, valuable in the TVF sense) if they are free in a 
libertarian sense (and if so they are Kanean SFAs). 
iii. From i and ii it follows that on Earth, in order to get the “freedom good,” you 
must have actions that also bring evil. 
iv. Our actions in heaven, however, do not include actions that shape our characters, 
because our characters are fully formed before we enter heaven. Instead, all 
heavenly actions are “actions from character” (AFCs). 
v. AFCs do not have to be free in a libertarian sense to be valuable in the TVF 
sense: a proximately determined AFC can still “truly free” and thus instantiate 
the freedom good so long as it is also remotely undetermined.  
vi. Evil is entirely avoidable when performing proximately determined AFCs (even 
though such actions are part of “general freedom”), so long as the character that 
proximately determines the action is morally pure.  
vii. From iv-vi it follows that in heaven we can get the freedom good without evil. 
 
Sennett’s attempted solution to the inconsistency of our ten theistic claims is, in effect, a 
modification of claims 5 and 10. Claim 5, IEF, becomes 
  
Claim 5.1: IELF (the Inevitability of Evil accompanying Libertarian Freedom): 
Libertarian Freedom is such that it is not in God’s power to create 
genuinely free beings like those alluded to in EARTHLY FREEDOM 
without them performing some evil acts. 
Claim 10: HEAVENLY FREEDOM, becomes 
Claim 10.1: HEAVENLY COMPATIBILIST FREEDOM: All acts in heaven are 
proximately determined. Those members of the redeemed (possibly all) 
who act freely do so because their acts are also remotely undetermined.  
 
Does this strategy allow Sennett to avoid APE? Consider the following thought experiment. 
 
7. Eartha and Celeste 
 
Two beings with identical characters arrive simultaneously in heaven. One of them, 
Eartha, had a pre-existing life on Earth during which time she underwent SFAs, while the 
other, Celeste, was simply brought into existence in heaven, character fully formed. Celeste’s 
nature is in no way derivative of Eartha’s: it is mere coincidence that they have identical 
natures.31 Imagine, for now, that heaven is such that one can observe its inhabitants 
performing actions. We observe Eartha and Celeste both performing the same action 
(adoration of God, say), for the same reasons. In both cases the actions are proximately 
determined AFCs. Are both equally valuable acts? On Sennett’s view they cannot be, for if 
they were, then Eartha’s earthly existence made no difference, and APE has not been 
rebutted. And in fact, according to Sennett, although both Eartha’s and Celeste’s are identical 
actions of beings that are identical in all respects that can be measured at the time they act, 
 only Eartha’s act of adoration is the kind of truly freely-given love that could make it 
valuable.  
Thus understood, Sennett’s view provides the following answer to APE. Earth has 
essential value because the only way for determined choices in heaven to be free in any 
valuable sense is if the character determining them was “self-formed” by the agent in her 
previous life on Earth. Thus Earth’s existence, evil-ridden as it is, is essential to ensure 
freedom in heaven. 
Does this seem a defensible analysis of Eartha and Celeste, however? According to 
Sennett, we can look at Eartha and remark, “ah, love given freely—is there anything of more 
value in the universe?” then turn to observe Celeste’s identical choice, performed for 
identical reasons, as a result of an identical character, shake our heads and say sadly, “what a 
worthless, puppet-like charade.”  
It gets worse: suppose we have no knowledge of their history prior to being 
inhabitants of heaven (and they’re no help, because they both have the same “memories”) but 
are told that only one of them has an earthly history, but not which one. We could scan them 
down to the subatomic level (or whatever celestial substance of which the redeemed are 
composed), find them identical, and still have to say “well, one of them’s a puppet, while the 
other is a free agent exhibiting the freedom good that has value beyond price, but there is 
absolutely no way for us to tell which.”  
Perhaps a defender of Sennett’s account might make the following response: “Such a 
distinction as that being made between Eartha and Celeste shouldn’t be so surprising: we can 
imagine a human and an android performing identical tasks, but we would only be inclined to 
say that the former is free.” But that would be a faulty analogy. For one thing, the reason why 
we don’t think of an android as free is because we assume it is not conscious, but Celeste is 
as conscious as Eartha. More importantly, in the human vs. android case, the distinction 
 would presumably be made on the basis of the human having and the android lacking the 
capability to choose otherwise. But this is something that Eartha and Celeste lack equally.  
Sennett might instead respond that the idea that whether or not an act is free in the 
way that is valuable depends in part on facts about history should not be as counterintuitive as 
I seem to find it. For comparison, questions of personal identity are usually taken to be 
similarly history-dependent.32 Who is my sister and who is her Star-Trek-transporter-
malfunction-produced duplicate cannot be settled simply by examining their current makeup, 
because it is identical. It depends on which of them originally entered the booth and pressed 
the button. Or, to press the analogy with “self-forming” actions, my real sister’s memories 
really are her memories because she was the one who did the action being remembered (and 
“formed” the memories in the first place), whereas the “memories” of the duplicate are not 
hers—she is not entitled to them. 
But actually, this case gives grounds for a pushback against the claim that it makes 
sense to call Eartha free while denying that Celeste is. Imagine two possible worlds: in one, 
my sister survives but the clone dies. In another, the reverse happens. In both worlds, the 
surviving individual performs exactly the same acts, none of which, let us stipulate, are 
undetermined in the way that SFAs have to be. My intuition is that if, in the world where she 
survives, my sister acts freely, then in the world where the clone survives she acts just as 
freely. But this would not be so on Sennett’s view, because the clone’s character was not 
formed by the clone, but by my sister (just as Celeste’s character was formed by God, and not 
by Celeste).  
I realize that I’m just appealing to intuitions here, and I am aware that others might 
have no problem with the idea that one’s freedom now cannot be assessed without knowledge 
of the past. So it behooves me to look more closely at the key notion of SFAs on which 
Sennett’s strategy rests.  
  
8. Self-formation 
 
To that end, the following questions need addressing. First, what exactly is the “self” 
or “character” (or occasionally, “will”) that needs to be formed on Earth and perfect in 
heaven? And second, what exactly is it for an action to be “self-forming” and how is that 
supposed to make the difference between possessing and lacking the capacity for determined 
yet free acts? 
Let us use “self” to stand for all and start from the rough idea that it is what we can 
point to as explanation for what we contribute to our actions. However, that crude outline 
encompasses a spectrum of concepts from “thick” to “thin.” A thick concept of a self would 
include just about every belief, desire and preference that any individual possesses.33 The 
“thicker” a self is, the more likely it is to include elements that cannot plausibly be said to 
have resulted from choices of mine.34 Certainly deeper tendencies, like (perhaps) an addictive 
personality, can be ineluctable and enduring elements of a thick self.35 This appears to 
indicate that a thick self will contain elements that are not “self-formed.” I believe this to be 
so, and we will explore the implications below (as well as a thinner conception of the self).  
Now let us look at self-formation. According to Kane and Sennett, having some SFAs 
in one’s past marks the difference between free proximately determined acts and those that 
are mere facsimiles of freedom. What is it about self-formation that makes this difference? I 
think the clearest answer follows from a well-known libertarian criticism of classic 
compatibilism, as follows. Recall that classic compatibilism suggests that freedom is about 
getting what you want without outside interference. That is, it is other people who stop you 
being free, but if you’re getting what you want, you are unimpeded and thus, free. 
Libertarians pointed out, however, that the two parts of classic compatibilism (getting what 
 you want, and not being controlled by others) are not coextensive. What if those other people, 
rather than force you to do the things that they want you to do against your will, instead 
manipulate your character so that you now want what they want.36 So, perhaps I brainwash 
you to want to give me all your money. Even if you give it to me “of your own free will,” and 
insist you are happy to do so, the vast majority of us would agree that this is not true freedom, 
certainly not the kind that underpins responsibility. Thus (the libertarians continue) it would 
seem that there is a strong case that, for an agent’s actions to be free, her character must not 
have been manipulated by others. From this negative requirement Kane gives us his positive 
solution of SFAs: if instead that agent’s character was formed by herself, then this would be 
the deciding factor that made her actions truly her own, ensuring that she be acting of her 
own free will. Sennett appears to concur: 
 
What I have in mind is this: many of the character traits we display—honesty, for 
example…were formed in us as a result of consistent behavior patterns that developed 
into habit. These behaviors were not always habitual, but began as overt, deliberate 
actions, perhaps taken after not a little pondering and soul-searching… Perhaps she 
now is so practiced in the art of probity that she responds with ingenuousness and 
veracity without hesitation or forethought. Her character demands and determines that 
she do so. But she could not have reached such a state had she not deliberately chosen 
honesty from among genuine alternatives in the past.37  
 
There are two problems with this explanation of the value of SFAs to freedom. The first is 
that more sophisticated compatibilists agree that brainwashed acts are not free, and that self-
formation is important, and have fully compatibilist accounts of self-formation.38 The second 
is that, given Kane’s expressed concern over IUC, adding indeterminism to these acts of self-
 formation (as Kane and Sennett both want in order to avoid the consequence argument,39 and 
Sennett needs to support IEF on Earth) appear to undermine them, not complete them. 
Sennett is aware of the possibility of compatibilist SFAs, as he makes clear here: 
 
Of course, this scenario is open to the charge that these precedent deliberate actions 
were themselves the determinate product of her character as it stood at that time, and 
so the standard compatibilist position would insist. But again such a response would 
suggest a regression that will inevitably lead back to before her birth, and the 
Consequence Argument again threatens.40 
 
Again, though, his response is simply that the consequence argument requires indeterminism. 
But the Marvel Origin Case shows that simply adding indeterminism is not enough to make 
the difference between freedom and its lack, so you can’t just stick a bit of indeterminism 
onto something that doesn’t need it and think it fixes the problem. It has to be that 
indeterminism is baked in to SFAs (in a way that it is not in regular actions). Sennett is no 
help here, but Kane, who appears to take IUC much more seriously, has attempted an account 
that does this.41  
 
9. Plural Voluntary Control 
 
Let us bring out the real contrast between compatibilists and libertarians over the role 
of indeterminacy with an example Kane himself uses.42 Imagine two possible worlds, 
identical up to a moment of choice. In one, a businesswoman choses to stop and help a person 
in need, in the other she hurries past to get to a meeting. The libertarian must insist that both 
different futures must be entirely physically possible consistent with the same past for it to be 
 the case that the businesswoman’s choice (of either future) is truly free. Compatibilists are 
simply incredulous at this, charging that if her character (plus the laws of nature) doesn’t 
favor one over the other then neither choice is truly “hers” and she has experienced a random 
event rather than made a decision that is a result of deliberation. Kane attempts a 
compromise. 
His first move is to argue that indeterminism does not completely undermine 
responsibility if it is successfully overcome: 
 
Consider an assassin who is trying to kill the prime minister, but might miss because 
of some undetermined events in his nervous system which might lead to a jerking or 
wavering of this arm. If he does hit his target, can he be held responsible? The 
answer…is “yes” because he intentionally and voluntarily succeeded in doing what he 
was trying to do—kill the prime minister. Yet his killing the prime minister was 
undetermined. (227) 
 
This is something that the compatibilist can concede, because the freedom is entirely 
explained by the extent of the determinism, and diminishes the greater the role of 
indeterminacy. However, the gulf between the libertarian and compatibilist is still wide: 
classic libertarianism must allow that even if there is no indecision and the businesswoman 
character is entirely set towards helping, then she could still walk on by, or even do 
something horrendous, like pushing the victim under an oncoming car.43 
 Kane’s second move is to reassure the compatibilist that these worse options will not 
happen. Instead, SFAs of the kind he envisages involve choices where the competing urges at 
work within the agent’s character pull with essentially equal force. She is genuinely 
 undecided between them, but would endorse either of them as both result from an aspect of 
her character: 
 
[W]e know the brain is a parallel processor and that capacity, I believe, is essential for 
the exercise of free will. In cases of self-formation, agents are simultaneously trying 
to resolve plural and competing cognitive tasks. They are, as we say, of two minds. 
But they are not therefore two separate persons. They are not disassociated from 
either task. (231-2)  
 
According to Kane, it is the competition itself that produces the indeterminacy that satisfies 
the requirement of the consequence argument.44 This, then, is Kane’s notion of “plural 
voluntary control:” “plural” because it involves a person being “of two minds,” but 
“voluntary control” because, if we think of the businesswoman’s “control center” overseeing 
her competing desires, it is saying “my second-order desire is that one of these competing 
desires be realized, but I will leave it up to chance to see which one.” Her “control center” 
desires something (that one of the desires be realized) and that overall desire is itself realized. 
This seems like the definition of classic compatibilist freedom, but with indeterminism baked 
in to satisfy the consequence argument. Everybody wins, right? 
Not so fast. This seems okay until we see the weight being placed on this notion of 
freedom. Acts like this, where there is plural voluntary control, are said to be essential to 
enable regularly determined acts to be free in the future. But to the compatibilists these 
actions are simply inferior versions of the determined acts. They are far from indicators of 
one’s true nature, or cases where one made a real decision that changed one’s life in a 
profound way. These are like mental “coin-tossings,” cases where the person didn’t care 
either way, and for that reason were prepared to allow randomness to choose. This is an 
 abdicating of responsibility, not an instance of true responsibility. Certainly not the kind of 
life-framing decision one expects in a SFA. Imagine somebody whose life was filled with 
nothing but such SFAs: I think we would call such a person aimless rather than admire her 
for the amount of genuine free self-formation she indulged in. 
Even worse, while I have been talking of a “control center” that oversees the 
competing desires, this was just a metaphor to illustrate Kane’s view. Kane puts it this way: 
 
[W]e say in effect, “Let’s try this. It is not required by my past, but is consistent with 
my past and is one branching pathway my life could now meaningfully take. I am 
willing to take responsibility for it one way or the other.” (238) 
 
But this description is disingenuous. It smacks of the “homunculus” view of the mind, as a 
mini-me inside my head watching monitoring screens and making decisions. If the brain 
really is a “parallel processor” then there may be no such central control. Certainly in the 
businesswoman case she is unaware that she is allowing a random process to control her fate; 
it just happens. There is no second-order desire. Ironically, if she were actually tossing a coin, 
she would be more responsible, but we would be very hesitant to call that worthy of a self-
forming action. I therefore conclude that Kane’s conception of plural voluntary control fails 
to offer an account that does justice to the notion of self-forming action 
But even supposing I am wrong about this, and Kane’s account were a resounding 
success, it would not be of use to Sennett. Recall that Sennett needs his indeterminism to 
account for all evil on Earth. It must be that, despite the perfection of God’s creation, 
including every aspect of human natures that can be attributed to God, the nature of earthly 
freedom is such that all of the horrors readily apparent on Earth will result. But we saw that 
Kane was insistent that the indeterminism only resulted from a clash of (two or more) already 
 existing desires. This means that any evil that resulted was already there in the individual. If 
this is true even of that individual’s very first SFA, then her self must already be corrupted 
before she ever has a chance to form it, which would lay the blame for any evil choices on 
her creator.45 Or to put it another way, Kane’s account means that IEF need not even be true 
of libertarian freedom. God could create us with such natures that even our undetermined 
choices could never result in evil. (Ironically, in an article broadly sympathetic to Sennett’s 
account but wishing to expand the freedom of the redeemed, Timothy Pawl and Kevin Timpe 
argue for the possibility of a kind of freedom that is similarly both libertarian and free from 
the risk of evil, where the redeemed get genuine undetermined choice, albeit between only 
good options, like “the choice either to sing in the heavenly choir or to play the harp.”46 I 
have different issues with Pawl and Timpe’s account that space does not permit airing, but 
suffice to say, if we can have a genuinely valuable, genuinely undetermined kind of freedom 
with no risk of evil resulting (provided God sets things up right), then we are once again 
confronted with the worry that there would not be evil if God were as theism says.) So it 
looks like Sennett needs somehow to extract Kane’s notion of SFAs without his particular 
account of how they work. But Sennett offers no alternative, and thus his account stands or 
falls with Kane’s. 
 
10. Clay and Rock, Mary and Jezebel 
 
Further problems arise concerning the as-yet-unsettled precise nature of the self that is 
to be formed. We have been working so far with a thick self, which, we have seen, includes 
many elements that cannot plausibly be said to have originated from free choice, and thus 
were “given to us,” and may even stubbornly resist attempts by us to mold them (assuming 
we are even aware of them). In fact, it seems to me that some people are much more open to 
 having their characters shaped than others, so to what degree (if at all) “self-forming” is 
possible may vary across individuals in a way that they have no control over.  
Consider potential self-formers Clay, who has a malleable character, and Rock, who 
has a supremely inflexible character. Suppose further that both Clay and Rock perform the 
same undetermined virtuous action (laying aside compatibilist qualms for now). With Clay, 
this action lays the groundwork for a reformed character. Truly, he is on the path to a 
perfected self. With Rock, however, this is just a one off. Tomorrow his undetermined action 
will be vicious, and he remains incorrigible. What should Sennett say about this difference? It 
seems like Clay might be on the way to freedom in heaven, while Rock is not, but only 
because of a feature of his self that was determined by forces beyond his control (presumably, 
for the theist, by God). Would Sennett say that Rock’s act, free though it was, and identical to 
Clay’s as it was, is not self-forming, precisely because it did not change him? That seems 
unfair, especially if, in the extreme, he never performs any SFA and is thus robbed of the 
chance of freedom in the afterlife simply because of an inflexible nature. 
Alternatively, imagine Mary and Jezebel. Mary’s inborn nature is saint-like—bad 
thoughts never even occur to her—while Jezebel was born with a character riddled with 
desires, tendencies and even perhaps mental and physical disorders that render it very far 
from perfection. Nonetheless, somehow (let us stipulate) both perform the same set of 
undetermined SFAs (something that could only happen if the actions truly were undetermined 
by the natures of those performing them). Mary’s character is perfected in short order, and is 
thus ready for heaven, but Jezebel’s is not. This seems unfair, and in fact seems an injustice 
that cannot, by its very nature, be explained away by a free will defense, because Jezebel is 
disadvantaged over somebody who makes exactly the same choices. 
 It seems to me that there are two lines of response open to Sennett over cases like 
these. The first would be to argue that it is effort that counts and that Rock’s effort will be 
recognized as much as Clay’s, and Jezebel will be welcomed into heaven if Mary is. 
The problem remains, however, that Rock and Jezebel have unperfected characters. 
Does this mean we are rejecting IMPECCABILITY? If so, we run the risk of evil in heaven. 
To block this, perhaps we can stipulate that, once you get into heaven your selves are 
perfected automatically by God, so that Jezebel acquires as pure a character as Mary. No; 
surely we cannot stipulate this. Apart from the fact that there would be issues of personal 
identity (in what sense is heavenly, perfect Jezebel the same person as flawed, earthly 
Jezebel?), this new Jezebel seems disturbingly similar to Celeste, in that the perfect self that 
will determine all her actions henceforth was not a product of her SFAs.47 
Alternatively, perhaps Rock and Jezebel can keep their characters in heaven but be 
blocked from their choices ever producing evil. But this possibility cannot seriously be 
entertained by somebody who argues, as all free will defenders do, that you cannot thwart 
even the free choice of Satan to torture humans without robbing freedom of its true value. 
The second line of response might be for Sennett to argue for anorexia of the self. 
That is, instead of a “thick” self that includes attributes beyond the control of its possessor, 
we should narrow down the self to consist simply of the things that have been chosen by that 
person. Perhaps we could reserve the name “self” for the thick self and “character” for this 
thin self.48  
This maneuver again threatens personal identity. Are we to imagine that our 
“determined” earthly characteristics, like a love of beer, sex and coffee, will be replaced in 
heaven by more “appropriate” desires, albeit with no loss of self? If the response is that all 
that really matters about us, our essence, is our freely chosen character, then what about those 
who die very young (who have an even more serious problem, as we shall see in the next 
 section) who would seem to have no characters at all, not having had the chance to perform 
any SFAs? What would they be like in heaven, with such “thin” characters? (Remember, 
Sennett cannot allow them to expand their characters in heaven, because SFAs are confined 
to Earth.) 
Second, even given this maneuver, surely it is clear that those whose pre-determined 
natures and circumstances were such that their choices were simply between two “good” 
options would further be advantaged. It would be like comparing the portfolios of two artists, 
one who had unlimited resources and vast natural talent, and one who only had a twig to 
work with and no limbs to hold it.  
Third, if we define character as what results from SFAs, then we are forced to say that 
Kane’s businesswoman 1 was good because indeterminism resulted in her helping, while 
businesswoman 2 was bad, despite having exactly the same beliefs, desires and intentions. 
This makes businesswoman 2 look merely unlucky rather than deserving of heavenly 
rejection. 
Finally, remember that the “self” in self-forming is supposed to be the active former 
as well as the passive material being formed. But in this extremely narrow view of self-as-
character, how do we explain the first SFA? Before an act has occurred, there is no character 
to do the forming or to be formed. Who exactly is it performing the SFA? On this view, we 
would all bring ourselves into being out of nothingness. And that is beyond even God. 
 
11. “Little Angel Automatons” 
 
Let us imagine that there is an account of SFAs that can solve all of the foregoing 
problems, so that a first SFA is possible, and that even the first SFA of an unblemished 
character could result in evil. Nonetheless, the fact that there has to be a first SFA creates a 
 huge problem for Sennett. To introduce this problem, it is also worth reminding ourselves of 
what started this whole discussion: the problem of evil. A phenomenon that has made the 
problem particularly vivid for me since I first read about it while teaching Bioethics is the 
horrific genetic condition Hallopeau-Siemens syndrome. It was after Sanne, a baby with this 
condition was born on his ward, that Dutch pediatrician Eduard Verhagen began to advocate 
for euthanasia for infants: 
 
Her skin would literally come off if anyone touched her, leaving painful scar tissue in 
its place. The top layers of mucous membranes inside her mouth and esophagus fell 
away any time she was fed, which was done by tube… Her cry was not that of a 
normal, healthy baby but the shriek of an extraordinarily sick one. And her vital 
signs—heartbeat, blood pressure and respiration—reflected those of a child in 
extreme stress. Pain relievers seemed to be useless. Making matters worse, Dr. 
Verhagen and his colleagues had to bandage Sanne’s scar tissue knowing they were 
contributing to a vicious circle: every time they replaced the bandages, a little more 
skin fell off… Her parents demanded an end to her suffering, which moved Dr. 
Verhagen to consider euthanasia. Fearing criminal prosecution, he and hospital 
officials refused and eventually sent Sanne home, where she died of pneumonia half a 
year later. Dr. Verhagen felt he had failed Sanne and her parents, believing all three 
had suffered longer than necessary.49 
 
Surely the parents of any baby born with this condition are caused to wonder why God would 
allow it. This is what we need theodicies for. Of course, it also reveals a weakness for the free 
will defense: it is particularly ill-equipped to deal with so-called “natural” evils like this, 
because they look so clearly like “acts of God.”50 Nonetheless, the free will defense is by far 
 the most respected response to the problem of evil, so it is the best answer we will get. For 
the purposes of this paper, though, cases like Sanne’s present a different challenge. We are 
asked to believe one of two unacceptable things: either that such an infant is able to perform 
SFAs some time in her short agony-filled (or heavily sedated, if she is lucky) earthly 
existence, or that she does not, and is thereby condemned not just to earthly agony but to an 
afterlife of unfreedom. 
The first option is untenable. Kane allows that SFAs can be rare.51 On any plausible 
account of self-formation, SFAs presumably require a certain level of brain maturity. We do 
not regard young children as responsible moral agents for good reason, and we certainly do 
not regard infants as such, so why should they be capable of true self-formation? There are 
quite rightly no human rights organizations arguing for the freedom of infants to make their 
own life decisions, and nobody regards paternalism towards them as an intolerable restriction 
of precious-beyond-price freedom.  
So it must be that babies like Sanne die before performing even a single act of self-
formation. On Sennett’s account this means they end up just like Celeste. Her every action in 
heaven is unfree, however indistinguishable it would be from those of supposedly free 
members of the redeemed like Eartha. Call this the Challenge of the Little Angel 
Automatons. It is a serious problem indeed for Sennett’s two-stage conception of freedom, 
because it means that millions and millions of the redeemed are denied precious freedom, 
through no possible fault of their own.52 For their entire infinite existence they will never 
sample the good that is supposed to be beyond price, and worth the cost of all the misery on 
Earth. 
What is worse, for Sennett this problem combines with APE to form an apparently 
inescapable dilemma: either you don’t need Earth to get the freedom good, in which case we 
face APE and the attendant problem of evil (as well as an incentive to usher our infants into 
 heaven before they risk suffering or have the chance to sin and risk an eternity in hell), or 
every soul must be formed on Earth, in which case those millions who perish before having a 
chance are denied the chance at freedom itself, and all the things that require it, including, 
presumably, love of God in heaven. Can this new dilemma be avoided? In what follows I will 
assess various attempts to do so. 
 
12. Possible Responses 
 
i) No Possibility of Death before First SFA 
 
If there were no possibility of a person dying without performing a SFA then we can 
avoid a heaven full of Little Angel Automatons. But how would this work? It would require 
SFAs to happen essentially immediately a human came into being. But supposedly SFAs are 
instances of individuals having some control over their own personality, and hence their 
value: 
 
if there were no such undetermined SFAs in our lifetimes, there would have been 
nothing we could have ever voluntarily done to make ourselves different than we 
are—a condition that I think is inconsistent with our having the kind of responsibility 
for being what we are which genuine free will requires.53 
 
Of course, I have argued that Kane’s own plural voluntary control account pretty much 
makes nonsense of the idea that SFAs are us “voluntarily” forming ourselves, but for the 
newly-formed zygote or even the late-term fetus, such a description is positively laughable. If 
we are to say that SFAs happen immediately a being comes into existence then we need a 
 different, weaker account of SFAs, and then we would also need an explanation of why they 
are of value. And for any weaker conception of a SFA, the challenge is to show that it is not 
simply an undetermined event that happens to an unknowing, unchoosing, pre-moral-agent, 
something the Marvel Origin Case showed was of no help to the libertarian. I conclude that 
this response is a non-starter. We should always remember that the “self” in “self-forming” is 
not just the thing being formed, but the agent doing the forming. Thus self-forming cannot 
happen unless there is an existing agent able to make choices. 
One remaining possibility is if it is argued that it is persons, that is, beings actually 
capable of moral agency, who can go to heaven, and it is then stipulated that, by definition, a 
person only comes into existence with the first SFA. This would solve the problem (though 
we still have the “thin character” problem discussed earlier if death occurs after only one or 
two SFAs), but at the cost of denying that babies or even young children will have lives 
beyond the grave, because they would be non-persons. This, I think, is too steep a price for 
the vast majority of theists to pay. 
 
ii) Purgatory 
 
Jerry Walls has argued for a conception of purgatory not as a place of punishment, but 
of post-mortem sanctification, to perfect us for heaven. He sees the necessity for this to 
follow from two “basic facts:” first, IMPECCABILITY, and second: 
 
The great majority of persons—all, according to many theological traditions—are far 
from perfect when they die… [T]his is true even on the assumption that everyone has 
made at least some progress in the pursuit of holiness, some more than others. The 
 obvious fact remains that most are not completely holy, let alone impeccable, when 
they die.54 
 
These two theistic commitments suggest that there must be a post-mortem sanctification 
process lest heaven be entirely unpopulated, and they combine with a third, that “we 
[humans] must cooperate in our sanctification”55 to suggest that that post-mortem process 
should not simply be God “zapping” us into perfection, but rather a more drawn-out process, 
which requires a non-earthly, non-heavenly location to take place in. 
Walls’s intended role for purgatory is thus as a kind of finishing school for the 
character. Will it be suited for tiny students? If so, who is to be their teacher? Do we acquire 
instant knowledge of the one true faith upon entering purgatory, or is it just like Earth, only 
one exits at sanctification (or, presumably, proving oneself irredeemable, in which case a trap 
door opens) because there is no exit via death? Its denizens (purgatorians?) must be capable 
of SFAs for it to serve its purpose, so presumably, on the Kane-Sennett view, evil must also 
occur there. How is it a better place to become perfect than Earth, then? Is it just that we have 
an infinity of time to work on it? 
Let us set aside philosophical and theological objections to the very idea of 
purgatory56 and focus on a more pressing problem. While purgatory might offer a way to 
address the Little Angel Automatons problem, it does so only at the cost of critically 
exacerbating APE. If newborn babies (or possibly even embryos, depending on the cut-off 
line for personhood and thus potential redemption) who have yet to have had the chance to 
make a single decision before dying and exiting Earth can, in purgatory, mature to fruition 
and perfect their souls while simultaneously performing the undetermined SFAs that allow 
for freedom in heaven, then we really have no need of Earth. Previously we could at least 
 claim there was a point to Earth as a place for the indeterminism necessary for heaven from 
which it was banished, but with purgatory, that role is taken.57  
 
iii) Two Kinds of Value, Objective and Subjective 
 
One final, radical response to the problem of Little Angel Automatons is to bite the 
bullet and agree that yes, they would not have freedom, but assert that this would not matter 
to them. They would be just as happy as those who do. There is some plausibility in this: it 
makes sense to say that Eartha and Celeste are having exactly the same subjective experience 
of heaven, and indeed, feel identical beatific joy. 
What does this say about the value of freedom? Sennett wanted to argue that the 
redeemed were free in heaven, presumably to support SUBLIMITY, the theistic claim that 
heaven is a better plane of existence for the redeemed than their life in heaven, and given 
TVF, the claim that freedom is necessary for something of transcendent value. But this move 
claims that some of the redeemed can be equally happy without the capacity for freedom (in 
fact, given that they died before a single SFA, they never even had freedom on Earth). How 
can this be sustained? 
The only possible way would be to suggest that somehow heaven is subjectively 
better, but that objectively it is better that there be an Earth. That is, the transcendent value of 
freedom is an objective one: it is just a fact that a universe that contains, say, truly freely-
given love, or “morally significant” freedom, which requires undetermined choice where evil 
is an option (to give two favorite candidates of free will defenders), is better than one without 
such things, but that this value is not felt by any of the inhabitants of the universe. What they 
feel, and what they value, are simply feelings, which may or may not be triggered by the 
exercise of genuine freedom. 
 This tack would definitely be novel. Too novel, I think, for any but the most radical 
theist to endorse. It also raises all kinds of questions: how many free beings must a universe 
contain to achieve the objective value? Is it quantifiable, so that more free beings means 
greater value? But then why are so many potential free beings allowed to die without 
exercising a single SFA? And it also raises yet another, new, variant of the problem of evil 
(and APE). If the exercise of true freedom is of no value to us, why is it that we have to suffer 
to produce it? There would certainly be more subjective happiness in a universe that 
contained no Earth (or purgatory) but only a heaven stuffed with Celeste-like beings (hence 
APE again). If God created the one we have over that one, he has favored objective value 
over the happiness of his creatures. God is using people on Earth (and requiring us to suffer 
all the evils that are present here) for some purpose that has nothing to do with any good that 
we could experience. We are all just pawns in some greater game. It cannot be said that we 
experience any benefit from the freedom we get on Earth, because the freedom we have in 
heaven is, if anything, better for us, and worse, the same for us as the faux freedom of Celeste 
and the Angel Automatons is for them. 
 
13. What’s a Theist to Do? 
 
I have argued that it is impossible to reconcile the view of freedom needed for theistic 
responses to the problem of evil with a belief that the redeemed in heaven can act freely 
without the risk of sin. James Sennett’s attempt at a reconciliation with a two-level 
conception of freedom fails for a variety of reasons. It rests on Robert Kane’s work that is not 
just unconvincing but unable to provide the kind of freedom on Earth required by the free 
will defender to absolve God of responsibility for evil. Even if Sennett could provide a 
different basis for his two-level view than Kane’s, however, his view would either consign 
 millions of very young infants to an eternity of unfreedom, or rely on there being a purgatory 
whose existence renders our Earth’s at best redundant and at worst an unnecessary risk to our 
eternal fate. 
A theist convinced by my arguments faces a choice of beliefs to discard: belief in 
heavenly freedom, belief in a heaven free from evil, or commitment to the use of free will in 
a defense or theodicy. It’s not a happy choice. Self-interest would seem to lie with 
abandoning the last, in the hope that we can come up with an alternative explanation of the 
evil we see all around us, because, after all, the earthbound section of our existence is 
supposed to be an infinitesimal fragment of the whole. Heaven is too important a part of 
theism to compromise.58 
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Notes 
 
1. I include in this not just “free will defenses” but also John Hick’s “soul-making” 
theodicy—see note 31. 
 
  
2. Strictly speaking, a “defense” against the problem of evil is usually taken to mean a 
demonstration that it has not been proven that an omnipotent, all-loving God is 
inconsistent with the existence of evil. This is weaker than a “theodicy,” whose claims 
are asserted as being actually or probably true rather than merely not proved false. I will 
use the term loosely (as has become common) to cover both defenses and theodicies, and 
the term “free will defender” to refer to those who are committed to either.  
3. Sennett 1999. 
4. Strictly speaking the problem can be expressed without this claim, but the claim that 
God created the universe the way it is, and could presumably have made it otherwise, 
certainly makes the problem vivid. 
5. For those steeped in the work of Alvin Plantinga (see, e.g., his 1977, 2009) or other 
molinists, the phrase “freedom is such that…” can be read as “it is possible that the 
counterfactuals of freedom are such that…” 
6. The nature of the phenomenon depends on the version of the defense/theodicy. Popular 
candidates include actions of moral worth, freely given love, and the mere exercise of 
genuine freedom. 
7. See for example Plantinga 1977, part I and Swinburne 1996, chapter 6. 
8. There are views that assert the existence of a heaven that is as yet empty of (ex) humans. 
(See John 3:13, but contrast 2 Kings 2:11.) For such views claims like this one and the 
others about heaven can be re-parsed into the future tense 
9. “To use a classic theological term, those in heaven must be fully perfect in character in 
such a way that they are ‘impeccable,’ which means that they can no longer sin. Doing 
evil must be impossible for the redeemed in heaven.” Walls 2015, 94. 
  
10. “Best” is vague here. Pawl and Timpe offer: “heaven is essentially a place of ultimate 
happiness” and “the state of human existence than which none more desirable can be 
conceived,” Pawl and Timpe 2009, 401. 
11. Sennett 1999, 79, note 4. 
12. Remember that the free will assumed by free will defenders has to explain all the horrors 
that we see on Earth. How would heaven be better if its inhabitants are capable of the 
same atrocities? Even if the worst offenders would be in hell, IEF seems to require that 
evil be done, and good people can turn evil if evil is done to them. And suppose 
heavenly inhabitants do commit evil acts. Should they be thrown out a la Lucifer? This 
causes eschatological problems: can hellions also get promoted for good behavior? Is 
there a revolving door in the afterlife? Or does heaven steadily empty? Alternatively, if 
sinners get away with it in heaven, that seems unfair on those punished for earthly sins. 
Why should the location of your sin’s commission rather than the nature of the sin itself 
determine your punishment? 
13. It used to be that Catholic Doctrine condemned the unbaptized to hell, which would 
certainly preclude piously-and-altruistically-motivated abortions, but this doctrine has 
softened steadily, first to the suggestion that those infants would go to limbo, and then 
even limbo was phased out in 2007 with the publication of “The Hope of Salvation for 
Infants Who Die Without Being Baptized” 
(http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_con_cfaith_
doc_20070419_un-baptised-infants_en.html). For more on limbo, see chapter 12. 
14. The view is so named because it is the view that freedom is compatible with (causal) 
determinism, which is the view that every event that happens does so in a way that is 
entirely predictable given the combination of background conditions and laws. So, for 
example, given the state and laws of the universe at any particular moment, there is only 
  
one action it is physically possible for any individual to perform: that person is 
determined to do so. (This is not to say that is logically impossible that they do 
otherwise, as compatibilists often point out: see for example Lewis 1981.)  
15. There are exceptions—see for example Baker 2003. But even she begins by quoting 
Zagzebski to the effect that the belief “that human beings have free will in a sense…that 
is incompatible with determinism” is “central to Christian practice.” (Zagzebski 1991, 
3.) 
16. Kane 2005, 149. See also Pawl and Timpe 2009, 399. 
17. Van Inwagen 1984, 16. Cited by Sennett 1999, 72. 
18. There is controversy over where to draw the border line between internal and external, 
which we can gloss over here. We will also treat “self” and “character” as 
interchangeable for the time being, but look into a possible distinction later. 
19. Possible worlds are favorite tool for philosophers. Roughly a “possible world” is like the 
parallel universes beloved of science fiction. It is not part of our universe, it is an 
alternative to it. So another possible world where I am president is an entire alternative 
universe that contains somebody whom we can (for reasons that differ among 
philosophers) identify as me, except that he is president. Another possible world cannot 
be reached from this one and philosophers differ on whether they are real or not. But 
they are useful ways of thinking of “counterfactuals”—that is, ways things could have 
been even if they actually weren’t. The online entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy is, as always, a great resource for those unfamiliar with the topic. 
20. Imagine there was a particularly savage serial killer (the Deranged Disemboweler) on 
the loose in your city. Hearing of this killer’s gruesome crimes, your mother calls you up 
and asks, in all earnestness, “Are you the Deranged Disemboweler?” When you respond 
  
in outrage, she seems surprised and says, “But don’t you want true freedom? And that 
requires that all options be open to you, no matter what your character.” 
21. Hume 1988, 90-91.  
22. Kane 1999, 237. 
23. Dennett 1984, 133, Kane 1996, 38, 2005, 81. Sennett 1999, 73 has “I cannot do 
otherwise,” which substitutes clarity for euphony. 
24. “Possible” in the sense of “possible for Luther in the actual world with its actual laws.” 
Both compatibilists and libertarians can agree that other actions are logically possible. 
25. J.L. Mackie famously argued (Mackie 1955, 1982) that even were we to be free in a 
libertarian sense this would not be sufficient to make IEF plausible. I am inclined to 
agree with him, but many have argued otherwise, and I will set that debate aside in this 
paper. 
26. Why should I be praised for helping an old lady across the road if I could equally well 
have pushed her under the bus, given exactly the same character? Why should I be 
blamed for murder if my character does not determine it and there’s a possible world 
where, with exactly the same character, I lead a blameless life?  
27. The phrase itself is ambiguous, because the “self” part could be the active former or the 
passive formee. However, it seems clear that Kane intends it to be both. This sounds a 
bit like pulling oneself up by one’s own bootstraps, and we will devote a later section to 
scrutinizing Kane’s conception in detail. 
28. Kane 2005, 130-1. 
29. Sennett 1999, 74. 
30. Sennett 1999, 75-6. 
31. An anonymous reviewer suggested to me that one might simply deny that their 
characters were “identical” because one’s character includes moral virtues, and whether 
  
or not one has moral virtues depends on the history of their formation. This is an idea 
put to use by John Hick’s “soul-making” theodicy (Hick 1966), which plainly addresses 
APE by suggesting the point of Earth is so that humans can have a hand in creating their 
souls by making free choices. The literature on Hick’s theodicy is voluminous (troubling 
apparent implications of it is are that it appears to place a limit on God’s power, and that 
humans who have gone through “soul making” have a kind of virtue unavailable to the 
angels and even to God), so I will not directly challenge it here (although I have more to 
say about it in chapter 12), except to note that its reliance on free will opens it up to 
problems I raise below, most notably the “little angel automatons,” and that if purgatory 
is a possible site for soul-making then APE recurs. As to the idea that whether or not 
one’s current action is virtuous depends on the history of one’s character formation, I 
address what I take to be the beliefs that might motivated it in what follows, especially 
the android example. 
32. The topic of personal identity, particularly over time (that is, settling the issue of 
whether, and if so, in virtue of what, current-me is the same person as me-aged-ten) is a 
much-discussed topic in philosophy. The chapters by Manninen, Olson, and Guillon in 
this volume provide good examples. Derek Parfit has done more than any other 
philosopher to popularize the use of Star Trek transporters in such discussions—for a 
fairly accessible example, see Parfit 1995. 
33. Notice that this would include qualities that are inessential to the issue of personal 
identity through time. That is, I used to hate beets but now I don’t, and yet I am the same 
person throughout. Nonetheless, my early avoidance of beets can be explained by my 
childhood “thick” self, which included a beet-aversion, while my current willingness to 
eat beets can be explained by my adult beet-acceptance. 
  
34. Perhaps you might make a case that my later beet-acceptance was something I chose if I 
made a conscious decision to overcome my distaste for them and forced myself to eat 
them over a sustained period until I had beaten my former revulsion into submission. 
But, even if so, that wouldn’t change the fact that the early dislike was something I 
acquired involuntarily from forces (genetics, environment) beyond my control. 
35. The dispute over whether or not one’s sexuality, for example, is “chosen” or innate 
could be couched in terms of whether or not it is a product of (or amenable to alteration 
by) self-formation.  
36. Kane (1996, 2005) is a great resource for the philosophical literature on this point. But 
such character manipulation is also a trope in a lot of fiction. The books and films The 
Manchurian Candidate, A Clockwork Orange, and Total Recall (based on the Philip K. 
Dick short story “We Can Remember It for You Wholesale”) suggest ways this might 
work. Your would-be controllers could manipulate your desires so you want to kill 
people they want assassinated, or you can no longer do the violent acts you used to 
enjoy without being violently ill, or your memories could be altered so that you believe 
you are a person whose life fits their needs. 
37. Sennett 1999, 74-5.  
38. Mill, an avowed compatibilist, asserted, “we are exactly as capable of making our own 
character, if we will, as others are of making it for us” (J.S. Mill, A System of Logic, 
Book 6, Chapter 2, §3.) and in fact there are several compatibilist accounts of self-
formation. Harry Frankfurt (1971) suggested (very roughly) the following. One’s 
character can contain conflicting desires: the desire to have a cigarette and the desire to 
stop smoking, for example. Desires like the second (“second order” desires—desires 
about one’s own desires) are more integral to one’s true character, and it is in allegiance 
to those that one can alter the lower-level aspects of one’s own character by, for 
  
example, isolating oneself from cigarettes until the urge (ideally) disappears. Surely 
these are cases where the self both is in charge of change and is itself changed? 
However, Frankfurt’s view has been challenged by many critics—again, Kane provides 
a good overview (1996, 2005). 
39. “[T]he standard compatibilist doctrine of free actions as those determined by the agent’s 
character escapes the Consequence Argument only if the agent’s character was formed, 
at least in part, by proximately undetermined free actions by the same agent,” Sennett 
1999, 75. 
40. Sennett 1999, 75. 
41. All quotes that follow are from Kane 1999. 
42. Kane 1999, 225. 
43. Or becoming the Deranged Disemboweler (see note 20 above). 
44. “There is a tension and uncertainty in our minds at such times of inner conflict… a kind 
of stirring up of chaos in the brain that makes it sensitive to microindeterminacies at the 
neuronal level. As a result, the uncertainty and inner tension we feel at such soul-
searching moments of self-formation is reflected in the indeterminacy of our neural 
processes themselves,” Kane 1999, 224-5. 
45. Consider Eve. Why is she wrong to eat the apple? Because God told her not to. But if 
her character was perfect to begin with, then not only would she never consider 
disobeying him, she would never indulge in SFAs that would form her character into 
one that would consider disobeying him, and the Fall would have been averted. And 
that’s not even to get into the character of the Serpent. 
46. Pawl and Timpe 2009, 408: “If both of these actions are consistent with the nature of 
heaven and one sees good reasons for engaging in both activities, then one’s moral 
  
character needn’t determine one’s choice either way. …[T]here can be non-derivative 
free choices even in heaven.” 
47. Perhaps, instead of being “zapped” into perfection (to use Jerry Walls’ terminology—
Wall 2015, 94, 112) Jezebel could take a trip to purgatory and continue working on her 
self until she has finally reached Mary’s level. We will discuss purgatory below, but 
notice that (a) Jezebel has to work a lot harder than Mary through no fault of her own, 
and may in fact never make it, and (b) this wouldn’t help Rock, who cannot change. 
48. Strictly speaking, if we make this terminological switch we should be discussing CFAs 
rather than SFAs in what follows, but to avoid yet more acronyms we’ll retain the 
former. 
49. “A Crusade Born of a Suffering Infant’s Cry,” New York Times, March 19, 2005. 
50. Consider Plantinga’s suggestion for the source of natural evil: “Satan, so the traditional 
doctrine goes, is a mighty non-human spirit, who, along with many other angels, was 
created long before God created man. Unlike most of his colleagues, Satan rebelled 
against God and has since been wreaking whatever havoc he can. The result is natural 
evil,” Plantinga 1974, 192. We are apparently asked to believe that, to focus solely on 
the case of Hallopeau-Siemens syndrome, it is more important that Satan be free to 
torture babies (and in a different way, their parents and caregivers) than that God step in 
and undermine some of his efforts 
51. They might even be incredibly rare: how often would we have exactly equal strengths of 
reasons for both sides of a decision?  
52. The number goes up precipitously if you count the numbers of fertilized eggs (possibly 
up to a half of all conceptions) that modern medicine tells us spontaneously abort, often 
without the prospective mother even knowing they were fertilized. 
53. Kane 1999, 224. 
  
54. Walls 2015. 95. 
55. Walls 2015, 113. This should remind us again of Hick’s “soul making” (see note 31 in 
section 0), which suggests that the problem described below is also a problem for that 
theodicy. 
56. Positing an intermediate state to bridge the gap between heaven and Earth might strike a 
reader who until now had not considered that there might be a third post-mortem state as 
ad hoc and ontologically lavish. That said, it is an idea familiar to Catholics in 
particular. But this fact also reveals that it is theologically divisive. Walls himself says 
that “purgatory is a fighting word” and cites Calvin’s full-throated rejection of the 
notion: “purgatory is a deadly fiction of Satan, which nullifies the cross of Christ, 
inflicts unbearable contempt upon God’s mercy, and overturns and destroys our faith,” 
Walls 2015, 91-2. 
57. Or to put it another way: Walls’s purgatory is a place where one may perfect one’s 
character ready for heaven. If so, then one of two things must be true: either there is no 
evil possible in purgatory, in which case IEF is undermined, or it is just like Earth, with 
the possibility of evil, except that you cannot die, in which case what is the point of 
Earth? Earth would then be rather like a terrifying hoax, deceiving us about the 
necessities of our existence, possibly frightening us into actions that could condemn us 
into damnation down the line. 
58. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on an earlier version 
of this chapter. 
